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Abstract— In social systems, the evolution of interpersonal
appraisals and individual opinions are not independent pro-
cesses but intertwine with each other. Despite extensive studies
on both opinion dynamics and appraisal dynamics separately,
no previous work has ever combined these two processes
together. In this paper, we propose a novel and intuitive
model on the interplay between homophily-based appraisal
dynamics and influence-based opinion dynamics. We assume
that individuals’ opinions are updated via the influence network
constructed from their interpersonal appraisals, which are
in turn updated based on the individual opinions via the
homophily mechanism. By theoretical analysis, we charac-
terize the set of equilibria and some transient behavior of
our model. Moreover, we establish the equivalence among
the convergence of the appraisal network to social balance,
the modulus consensus of individual opinions, and the non-
vanishing appraisals. Monte Carlo validations further show that
the non-vanishing appraisals condition holds for generic initial
conditions. Compared with previous works that explain the
emergence of social balance via person-to-person homophily
mechanism, our model provides an alternative explanation
in terms of the person-to-entity homophily mechanism. In
addition, our model also describes how individuals’ opinions
on multiple irrelevant issues become correlated and converge
to modulus consensus over time-varying influence networks.
Index Terms— structural balance, appraisal dynamics, opin-
ion dynamics, network multi-agent systems
I. INTRODUCTION
a) Motivation and problem description: In social sci-
ences, it has been extensively studied, as opinion dynamics,
how individual opinions are shaped by social influences.
However, few mathematical models have been established
to explain how individual opinions react to interpersonal
relations. In fact, such reactions are frequently observed
and even being intentionally made use of. For example,
politicians and news media sometimes throw certain issues to
the public to generate conflicts and divisions of our society.
In this paper, we propose a novel model on the interplay
between opinion dynamics and interpersonal relations, and
investigate its consequences. We assume that the interper-
sonal appraisals, i.e., how much people like or dislike each
other, are determined by the opinion homophily mechanism.
That is, individuals holding similar opinions tend to be
friendly to each other, and vice versa. In the meanwhile, the
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interpersonal influences are proportional to the appraisals and
construct a time-varying signed influence network, on which
individual opinions are iterated via opinion dynamics.
b) Literature Review: Opinion dynamics on signed
influence networks have drawn considerable attention re-
cently [1]–[5]. Its dynamical behavior depends on whether
the signed influence network satisfies social balance [1],
i.e., whether it can be partitioned into two antagonistic
factions [6], where the social links within each faction are all
non-negative and the social links between the two factions
are all non-positive. According to [1], individual opinions
evolving on a connected influence network satisfying social
balance converge to bipartite consensus. That is, individuals
in one faction reach consensus on some opinion a, while
individuals in the other faction reach consensus on −a.
Specially, one faction can be empty, which leads to consensus
of all individual’s opinions. If the signed influence network
does not satisfy social balance, everyone’s opinion converges
to zero.
Recently, various models have been proposed to explain
how the interpersonal appraisal networks evolve to social
balance, e.g., see [7]–[12]. Some of them are based on
the homophily mechanism, see [11], [12]. However, the
homophily mechanism in these papers is the person-to-
person homophily, i.e., individuals holding similar appraisals
of the others tend to be friendly to each other. Therefore,
the models in [11], [12] are self-driven dynamics of the
appraisal networks, with no opinion dynamics involved. As
pointed out by Heider [6], the person-to-entity homophily
could also play a role in shaping the interpersonal appraisals.
This partly motivates our paper, where “entity” refers to
individuals opinions on certain issues irrelevant to appraisals.
c) Contributions: To the best of our knowledge, our
model is the first one that studies the interplay between
opinion dynamics and appraisal dynamics in social systems.
Theoretical analysis shows that our proposed model is well-
defined and the interpersonal appraisals and individual opin-
ions enjoy bounded behaviors. We further characterize the
set of equilibria of our model and their local stabilities.
Moreover, we establish the equivalence among the conver-
gence of the appraisal network to social balance, the modulus
consensus of individual opinions, and the non-vanishing
appraisals. Apart from the theoretical results, numerical
study shows the validity of the non-vanishing appraisals
condition for almost all generic initial conditions. In terms
of sociological interpretations, our model explains the emer-
gence of social balance via the person-to-entity homophily
combined with the evolution of individual opinions. Our
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TABLE I: Notations frequently used in this paper
1n The all ones n× 1 vector
R (Z≥0) Set of real numbers (non-negative integers)
0m×n A zero matrix with m× n dimensions
|X| Entry-wise absolute value of matrix X
sgn(X) Entry-wise sign of X , whose entry at ith row
and jth column is sgn(Xij)
|X|max (|X|min) maxi,j |Xij | (mini,j |Xij |)
Xi∗ (X∗i) The ith row (column) vector of X
A < B Aij < Bij for any i and j.
diag(x) The diagonal matrix, whose diagonal elements
are the elements of the vector x.
model also describes how individuals’ opinions on irrelevant
issues eventually become correlated due to the formation of
antagonistic factions.
d) Organization: The remainder of this paper is or-
ganized as follows. We introduce notations and necessary
definitions in Section II as well as the model description.
The main theoretical analysis are presented in Section III.
Finally, we conduct the numerical experiments in Section
IV to validate our model and theoretical contribution.
II. NOTATIONS, DEFINITIONS, AND MODEL SET-UP
Notations: Notations frequently used are defined in Table
I and adhere closely to those in [12]. In this paper, we
denote by X = (Xij)n×n appraisal matrix for a group of
n individuals. Here Xij denotes individual i’s appraisal of
j, i.e., Xij > 0 (Xij < 0 resp.) if i likes (dislikes resp.)
j. Xij = 0 is i does not know j or holds a neutral attitude
towards j. The appraisal matrix X defines a weighted and
directed graph G(X), referred to as the appraisal network.
Definition 1 (Social balance [6]): An appraisal network
G(X) satisfies social balance if Xii > 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and sgn(Xij) sgn(Xjk) sgn(Xki) = 1, ∀ i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Lemma 1 ([12]): For any X ∈ Rn×n such that all of its
entries are non-zero, G(X) satisfies social balance if and
only if it satisfies Xii > 0 for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
sgn(Xi∗) = ± sgn(Xj∗), for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
A. Model Description
Our novel model of the interplay between homophily-
based appraisal dynamics and influence-based opinion dy-
namics is formally presented as follows.
Definition 2 (The interplay model): Let Y (t) ∈ Rn×m be
the opinion matrix of n agents towards m issues at time t
and its entry Yij(t) represents agent i’s opinion on issue j.
Let X(t) be the appraisal matrix at time t. Given the initial
condition Y (0) = Y0 ∈ Y , where the set Y = {Y |Y (t) ∈
Snz−row, for any t ≥ 0, with Y (0) = Y }, the interplay
between the appraisal matrix X(t) and the opinion matrix
Y (t) is given by the following dynamics:
X(t+ 1) = diag(|Y (t)|1m)−1Y (t)Y >(t), (1)
W (t+ 1) = diag(|X(t+ 1)|1n)−1X(t+ 1), (2)
Y (t+ 1) = W (t+ 1)Y (t), (3)
or, equivalently, in the entry-wise form:
X(t+ 1)ij =
∑m
k=1 Yik(t)Yjk(t)
||Yi∗(t)||1 , (4)
W (t+ 1)ij =
Xik(t+ 1)
||X+i∗(t)||1
, (5)
Y (t+ 1)ij =
n∑
k=1
Wik(t+ 1)Ykj(t). (6)
The dynamical system (1)-(3) can be understood as the
following iteration process: At each time t + 1, via the
person-to-opinion homophily mechanism, individuals form
their interpersonal appraisals X(t+1) based on the previous
opinions Y (t). Then a signed influence matrix W (t + 1) is
constructed proportionally to the appraisal matrix X(t+ 1).
Finally, individuals update their opinions via the signed
influence matrix W (t + 1), obeying the opinion dynam-
ics model in [1]. Note that | diag(|Y (t)|1m)−1Y (t)| and
| diag(|X(t + 1)|1n)−1X(t + 1)| are both row stochastic.
This kind of normalization terms have been widely adopted
in both appraisal dynamics [12] and opinion dynamics with
antagonistic relations [13]–[15]. In addition, the assumption
Y (0) ∈ Y implies that, starting with the initial condition
Y (0), at any time t, every agent i has an non-zero opinion
on at least one of the m issues.
By combining (1)-(3), we can obtain the following model
in the form of the opinion dynamics:
Y (t+ 1) = diag(|Y (t)Y >(t)|1n)−1Y (t)Y >(t)Y (t). (7)
The system (7) concludes the interplay between homophily-
based appraisal dynamics (1) and influence-based opinion
dynamics (3). Obviously, Y is the domain of our model
in (7). For the convenience of presentation, the time step t
can be omitted in case of no ambiguity, i.e., X(t+ 1), Y (t),
and Y (t+ 1) are denoted as X+, Y , and Y +, respectively.
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide theoretical analysis regarding
the interplay model (1)-(3). The following lemma presents
some finite-time properties of the interplay model.
Lemma 2 (Finite-time behavior): Consider system (7)
and define f(Y ) = diag(|Y Y >|1n)−1Y Y >Y . For any
Y0 ∈ Y , the following statements hold:
i) the map f is well-defined for any Y0 ∈ Y;
ii) the solution Y (t), t ∈ Z≥0, to (7) with the initial
condition Y (0) = Y0 exists and is unique;
iii) the max norm of Y (t) satisfies |Y (t + 1)|max ≤
|Y (t)|max ≤ |Y (0)|max;
iv) for any c > 0, the trajectory cY (t) is the solution to (7)
from initial condition Y (0) = cY0.
v) |X(t+ 1)| is upper bounded by |Y (t)|max for any t ∈
Z≥0.
Proof: According to the equation (5) and (6), Y + =
f(Y ) is well-defined as long as X+ ∈ Snz−row, which is
naturally true by dynamics (1), since Y (t) ∈ Snz−row for
any t ∈ Z≥0 by assumption. This fact leads to statement i).
Statement ii) is the direct consequence of i).
By the system equations (2) and (3), we have |Y +ij | =
|∑nk=1X+ikYkj |
||X+i∗||1
≤
∑n
k=1 |X+ik||Ykj |
||X+i∗||1
≤ maxk |Ykj | ≤
|Y (t)|max. It implies statement iii) immediately.
Then, statement iv) is obtained by replacing Y (t) with
cY (t) on the right-hand side of (7), i.e., let Yˆ (0) = cY0. We
obtain
Yˆ (1) = diag(|c2Y0Y >0 |1n)−1cY0(cY0)>cY0 = cY (1).
For any t ≥ 1, Yˆ (t) = cY (t) holds true for the same
calculation.
Now we prove that statement v). According to equa-
tion (1),
|X+ij | =
∑m
k=1 |YikYjk|
||Yi∗||1 ≤
∑m
k=1 |Yik||Yjk|
||Yi∗||1 ≤ maxk |Yjk|.
It yields that |Xij(t+ 1)| ≤ |Y (t)|max for any t ∈ Z≥0.
Remark 1: Specifically, in single-issue case (m = 1),
Snz−row is an invariance set of the map f . For multi-issue
case (m > 1), Monte Carlo validation indicates that, for any
Y randomly picked from Snz−row, f(Y ) ∈ Snz−row holds
almost surely, see Section IV-B for the simulation set-up and
results.
Before embarking on the main results on the equilibrium and
the convergence of the opinion matrix Y (t), we introduce the
concept of non-vanishing of the appraisal matrix X(t).
Definition 3 ([12]): A time-varying appraisal matrix
X(t) satisfies the non-vanishing appraisal condition if
lim inft→∞mini,j |Xij(t)| > 0.
Proposition 1: For any initial condition Y0 ∈ Y such that
X(t) satisfies the non-vanishing appraisal condition, define
the set Υ = {Y (t)}∞t=0. Υ is the invariance set of the map
f . Moreover, f is continuous on the set Υ.
Proof: Υ is the invariance set of the map f is equivalent
to the statement: pick any y ∈ Υ, f(y) ∈ Υ holds true. Since
X(t) satisfies the non-vanishing appraisal condition, X(t)
and Y (t) must be defined at any time point t > 0. For any
Y (i) ∈ Υ, we have Y + = Y (i + 1) ∈ Υ. Thus, Υ is the
invariance set of the map f .
Now, we show that a map is continuous at any isolated
point. Let X0 be any isolated point and h be a map such that
Y0 = h(X0). For any  > 0 and neighbor set of Y0: BY0(),
there always exists δ > 0 and a neighbor set of X0: BX0(δ)
such that BX0(δ) = {X0}. Thus, f(BX0(δ)) = h(X0) =
Y0 ∈ BY0().
In addition, for any Y (i) ∈ Υ, Y (i) is the isolated point
in the set Υ, because there exists a neighborhood of Y (i)
which does not contain any other points of Υ. By definition,
a map g : A → B is continuous iff it is continuous at each
point of A. Since any map is continuous at the isolated point
and Υ contains only isolated points, f is continuous on the
set Υ.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium set): Given the opinion
dynamics in (7), for any Y ∗ ∈ {Y | |X+| =
| diag(|Y |1m)−1Y Y >| > 0}, Y ∗ is an equilibrium if
and only if Y ∗ is in the form of Y ∗ = [a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ],
where ai ∈ R, i = 1, ...,m, ρ ∈ {±1}n, and
∑m
i=1 a
2
i 6= 0.
Proof: By substituting Y ∗ = [a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ]
into (7), we can directly obtain that Y + = Y ∗, which shows
Y ∗ = [a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ] is the equilibrium of system of (7).
Now, we prove Y ∗ is the equilibrium only if Y ∗ is in this
form for any Y ∗ ∈ {Y | |X+| = | diag(|Y |1m)−1Y Y >| >
0}. Let i = arg maxk |Ykj |, we know that,
|Y ∗ij | =
|∑nk=1X+ikY ∗kj |
||X+i∗||1
≤
∑n
k=1 |X+ik||Y ∗kj |
||X+i∗||1
≤ max
k
|Y ∗kj |.
Notice that, all entries of X are non-zero under non-
vanishing appraisal condition and X is obviously sign-
symmetric. In order to make |Y ∗ij | = maxk |Y ∗kj | hold, the
following conditions must be satisfied:
a) sgn(X+i∗) = sgn(X
+
∗i) = ± sgn(Y ∗∗j);
b) All entries of Y ∗∗j have magnitude ||Y∗j ||∞.
It implies that for any k and l, there exist δk, δl ∈ {±1} such
that sgn(Y ∗∗k) = δk sgn(Xi∗) and sgn(Y
∗
∗l) = δl sgn(Xi∗).
Thus we have sgn(Y ∗∗k) = ± sgn(Y ∗∗l) and |Y ∗ik| = ||Y ∗∗k||∞.
It is equivalent that the equilibrium can only be in the form
Y ∗ = [a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ]. Clearly, Y ∗ is not allowed to be
a zero matrix. Thus there holds
∑m
i=1 a
2
i 6= 0 and hence
completes the proof.
Remark 2: If the opinion matrix converges to a fixed point
Y ∗ = [a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ], then the appraisal matrix X(t)
also converges to some equilibrium X∗ such that X∗ =∑m
k=1 a
2
k∑m
k=1 |ak|ρρ
>, which satisfies social balance. Obviously, any
Y ∗ = [a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ] leads to a unique X∗, but not the
other way around. That is, some X∗ at the steady state can
be derived from different equilibria Y ∗.
Remark 3: Given an equilibrium Y ∗ =
[a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ], there could exists some i such
that ai = 0. For example, the initial condition
Y (0) =

1 2 5
−1 −2 5
−1 −2 5
1 2 5
 leads to the equilibrium
Y ∗ =

0 0 5
0 0 5
0 0 5
0 0 5
 and X∗ =

5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5
 .
Specifically, in single-issue case, since all entries of the
appraisal matrix X(t) are obviously non-zero, Y ∗ = aρ
where a 6= 0 is the unique equilibrium for any initial
condition Y (0) ∈ Snz−row.
Remark 4: For the case Y ∗ /∈ {Y | |X+| =
| diag(|Y |1m)−1Y Y >| > 0n×n} , Y ∗ is an equilibrium
of the interplay model if Y ∗ = PYˆ P>, where P is a
permutation matrix and Yˆ = diag(A1, . . . , Al) with Ak =
[a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ] and l ≥ 2. The corresponding X∗ =
PXˆP>, where P is a permutation matrix and Xˆ is a
block diagonal matrix with blocks of the form αρρ> and
at least 2 blocks. X∗ doesn’t satisfy social balance and
non-vanishing appraisal condition. However, for any generic
initial condition, with 99% confidence level, the system does
not converge to this equilibrium. This will be validated in the
section IV-B by Monte Carlo validation.
Before investigating the property of convergence, we pro-
vide the formal definition of modulus sign-consensus and
modulus consensus.
Definition 4: (Modulus sign-consensus) The opinion dy-
namics reaches modulus sign-consensus, if there exists a
time point t0 ≥ 0 such that the non-zero opinion ma-
trix Y (t) satisfies sgn(Y (t)a∗) = ± sgn(Y (t)b∗) for any
a, b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and t ≥ t0. Moreover, the opinion
reaches sign-consensus, if sgn(Y (t)a∗) = sgn(Y (t)b∗) for
any a, b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}; The opinion reaches bipartite sign-
consensus, if there exist certain a, b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
sgn(Y (t)a∗) = − sgn(Y (t)b∗).
Definition 5: (Modulus consensus) The opinion dynamics
reaches modulus consensus if there exists a time point
t0 ≥ 0 such that the non-zero opinion matrix Y (t) satisfies
Y (t)a∗ = ±Y (t)b∗ for any a, b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and t ≥ t0.
Moreover, the opinion reaches consensus if Y (t)a∗ = Y (t)b∗
for any a, b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}; The opinion reaches bipartite
consensus if there exist certain a, b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that
Y (t)a∗ = Y (t)b∗.
Definition 4 shows two possible cases for modulus sign-
consensus. The first case is that there are only one faction
among all agents, in which all the agents support or are
against each issue. The other case is that there are two
factions among all agents, i.e., there exist at least two agents
a and b such that sgn(Ya∗) = − sgn(Yb∗). The agents reach
sign-consensus within each faction while they are against
others across the factions.
Modulus consensus in Definition 5 is stricter than modulus
sign-consensus since the magnitudes of opinions are taken
into consideration. Note that modulus consensus in Defini-
tion 5 has been already introduced in previous literature [1],
[2] for single-issue case. We generalize the definition for
the multi-issue case, which better describes agents’ attitudes
towards a set of issues. For our system, we have confirmed
that the equilibrium of opinion matrix in Theorem 1 satisfies
modulus consensus, since the condition Y ∗a∗ = ±Y ∗b∗ for
any a and b is apparently fulfilled. We then provide the
following proposition to characterize the properties of the
opinion dynamics.
Proposition 2 (Properties of modulus sign-consensus):
Consider the system in (7). For any given t0 ≥ 0, if
sgn(Ya∗(t0)) = ± sgn(Yb∗(t0)) for any a and b, the
following statements hold true.
i) the opinion reaches modulus sign-consensus and there
holds sgn(Y (t)) = sgn(Y (t0)) for all t ≥ t0.
ii) for any t ≥ t0 ≥ 0, |Y (t)|min is non-decreasing and
lower bounds |X(t+ 1)|.
Proof: By the model (7), there holds
sgn(Y +ij ) = sgn
(∑n
l=1
∑m
k=1 YikYlkYlj
||X+i∗||1
)
= sgn
(∑n
k=1XikYkj
||Xi∗||1
)
= sgn
(
n∑
l=1
m∑
k=1
YikYlkYlj
)
.
(8)
Firstly, we consider the case when Yij(t0) 6= 0 for all i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. We prove statement i) by
induction. Clearly, there holds sgn(Y (t)) = sgn(Y (t0)) if
t = t0. Suppose sgn(Y (s)) = sgn(Y (t0)) for some s > t0.
It follows that sgn(Ya∗(s)) = ± sgn(Yb∗(s)) for any agents
a and b. Thus there exist δil = ±1 such that
sgn(Yik(s)Ylk(s)Ylj(s))
= δil sgn(Ylk(s))
2 sgn(Ylj(s)) = sgn(Yij(s)).
(9)
In conjugation with (8), it follows that sgn(Yij(s + 1)) =
sgn(Yij(s)) and hence sgn(Y (s + 1)) = sgn(Y (s)). By
induction, one can obtain sgn(Yij(t + 1)) = sgn(Yij(t0))
for all t ≥ t0, which is equivalent to statement i).
Then if there exists certain Yap = 0, it yields that Y∗p =
0n×1. Note that the equation (9) still holds since its two
sides both equal to zero. In this regard, statement i) is also
true.
Now we prove statement ii). Since sgn(Ya∗(t)) =
± sgn(Yb∗(t)), we have
|X+ij | =
|∑mk=1 YikYjk|
||Yi∗||1 =
∑m
k=1 |Yik||Yjk|
||Yi∗||1 ≥ mink |Yjk|
≥ |Y (t)|min.
It follows that sgn(Xil) = sgn(Yi∗Y >l∗ ) = δil and
sgn(Xik) = sgn(Yi∗Y >k∗) = δik, where δil, δik ∈ {±1}.
Moreover, if all the entries of Y∗j are non-zero, sgn(Ylj) =
δil sgn(Yij) and sgn(Ykj) = δik sgn(Yij). Since all the
index of the above relationships are arbitrary, sgn(Xi∗) =
sgn(Yij) sgn(Y∗j) = ± sgn(Y∗j), which implies∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
k=1
X+ikYkj
∣∣∣∣∣ =
n∑
k=1
|X+ik||Ykj |. (10)
Note that if all the entries of Y∗j are zero, the equation (10)
still holds. Thus we can obtain
|Y +ij | =
|∑nk=1X+ikYkj |
||X+i∗||1
=
∑n
k=1 |X+ik||Ykj |
||X+i∗||1
≥ min
k
|Ykj | ≥ |Y (t)|min.
This completes the proof of statement ii).
Proposition 2 implies that that the set of modulus sign-
consensus opinion matrices is positively invariant along the
dynamics (7). Moreover, if Y (t0) satisfies modulus sign-
consensus, then Y (t) ∈ Snz−row and X(t) satisfies the
non-vanishing condition for any t ≥ 0. In addition, as
Proposition 2 implies, once the individuals form either one
all-friendly faction or two antagonistic factions based on the
signs of their opinions, they will stay in their factions from
then on.
The following theorem characterizes the relation between
social balance of the appraisal network and modulus consen-
sus of the opinions.
Theorem 2 (Social balance and modulus consensus):
Given the model in (7), the following statements hold true
a) Any equilibrium in the form of Y ∗ =
[a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ] where ai 6= 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
and ρ ∈ {±1}n is locally stable;
b) For any Y0 ∈ Y , the following four statements are
equivalent.
i) the solution of the appraisal matrix X(t) satisfies the
non-vanishing appraisal condition.
ii) there exists Y ∗ = [a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ] such that
limt→∞ Y (t) = Y ∗ and limt→∞X(t) = X∗ =∑m
k=1 a
2
k∑m
k=1 |ak|ρρ
>, where a ∈ R, ρ ∈ {±1}n, and∑n
i=1 a
2
i 6= 0.
iii) the opinion reaches modulus sign-consensus.
iv) there exists t0 > 0 such that G(X(t + 1)) achieves
social balance for any t ≥ t0 > 0.
Proof: For a), let ∆ = (∆ij)n×m, where maxi |∆ik| =
∆k < |ak| and Y (0) = Y ∗ + ∆. For any t ≥ 0, we have
sgn(Y (t)) = sgn(Y (0)) = sgn(Y ∗) and 0 ≤ |ak| − ∆k ≤
mini |Yik(t)| ≤ maxi |Yik(t)| ≤ |ak| + ∆k. It implies that
for any i and j, we have Yij(t) = αij sgn(Y ∗ij), where |ak|−
∆k ≤ αij ≤ |ak|+ ∆k. It follows that
|Y (t)− Y ∗|max = max
ij
|αij sgn(Y ∗ij)− |a| sgn(Y ∗ij)|
= max
ij
|αij − |a|| ≤ ∆k ≤ ∆ = max
k
∆k
Accordingly, for any  > 0, there exists ω =
min(maxk |ak|/2, /2) such that for any Y (0) satisfying
|Y (0) − Y ∗|max < ω, there holds |Y (t) − Y ∗|max <  for
any t ≥ 0. By definition, this shows that Y ∗ is locally stable
if ai 6= 0 for any i.
Now we prove that statement b) is true. Firstly, we show
that statement i) implies ii). By Proposition 1, f(x) is contin-
uous on the set Υ = {Y (t)}∞t=0. Υ is already a compact set,
since 0 ≤ |Yij(t)| ≤ |Y (0)|max. Define V (Y∗k) = ||Y∗k||∞.
V is continuous on Υ similar to the proof in Proposition 1.
By statement iii) in Lemma 2, V (Y +∗k) − V (Y∗k) ≤ 0 for
any Y ∈ Υ ⊂ Snz−row. According to the extended LaSalle
invariance principle in the article [16], we can obtain that,
for any Y0 ∈ Υ, Y (t) converges to the largest invariant set
M of the set T = {Y ∈ Υ|V (Y +∗k)− V (Y∗k) = 0}.
Now we characterize the largest invariant set M. For any
Y ∈ M, V (Y +∗j ) = V (Y∗j) = ||Y∗j ||∞. Suppose |Y +ij | =
maxl |Y +lj |. We have,
|Y +ij | =
|∑nk=1X+ikYkj |
||X+i∗||1
≤
∑n
k=1 |X+ik||Ykj |
||X+i∗||1
≤ max
k
|Ykj | = ||Y∗j ||∞.
(11)
Since X(t) satisfies the non-vanishing condition, it implies
that mini,j |Xij(t)| > 0 when t→∞. Hence, all entries of X
are non-zero. Besides, since all the inequalities in (11) must
hold as equalities, it requires that sgn(X+i∗) = sgn(X
+
∗i) =
± sgn(Y∗j) and all entries of Y∗j must have magnitude
||Y∗j ||∞. Thus we can conclude that M = {Y = Y ∗ =
[a1ρ, a2ρ, ..., amρ], where 0 ≤ ai ≤ ||Y (0)∗i||∞ and not all
ai are 0, for any i. By inserting Y ∗ directly into the equation
(1), we can obtain that limt→∞X(t) = X∗ =
∑m
k=1 a
2
k∑m
k=1 |ak|ρρ
>.
Then we illustrate that statement ii) implies iii). Since
limt→∞ Y (t) = Y ∗ and sgn(Ya∗(t)) = ± sgn(Yb∗(t)) for
any a and b after some time point t0 > 0, there exists a
neighbor set U(Y ∗) such that sgn(Y ) = sgn(Y ∗) for any
Y ∈ U(Y ∗). It follows that opinion reaches modulus sign-
consensus.
Here we prove that statement iii) can imply iv). Since
the opinion reaches modulus sign-consensus, there exists
t0 > 0 such that sgn(Ya∗(t)) = ± sgn(Yb∗(t)) for any a
, b and t ≥ t0. By proposition 2, it holds that sgn(Y (t)) =
sgn(Y (t0)) for all t ≥ t0. We show G(X(t + 1)) sat-
isfies social balance for any t ≥ t0 > 0 by definition.
There exist δij , δjl, δli ∈ {±1} such that sgn(X+ij ) =
sgn(
∑m
k=1 YikYjk
||Yi∗||1 ) = δij , sgn(X
+
jl ) = sgn(
∑m
k=1 YjkYlk
||Yj∗||1 ) =
δjl, and sgn(X+li ) = sgn(
∑m
k=1 YikYlk
||Yl∗||1 ) = δli. It yields
that sgn(X+ij ) sgn(X
+
jl ) sgn(X
+
li ) = δijδjlδli. By listing all
possible results of the above product, we obtain δijδjlδli = 1.
Hence we have sgn(X+ii ) =
∑m
k=1 YikYik
||Yi||1 > 0. It confirms
that G(X(t+ 1)) satisfies social balance for any t ≥ t0 ≥ 0.
It remains to show that statement iv) can imply i). Since
G(X(t + 1)) achieves social balance for any t ≥ t0 > 0,
there holds that sgn(X(t+ 1)ij) sgn(X(t+ 1)jk) sgn(X(t+
1)ki) = 1 ∀ i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} for t ≥ t0. It follows that
| sgn(X(t + 1)ij)| = 1 for any i and j. Thus there must
exists δ > 0 such that |Xij(t + 1)| > δ for each t ≥ t0.
Therefore, inf mini,j |Xij(t + 1)| ≥ δ > 0 for each t ≥ t0.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 reveals the equivalence among non-vanishing
condition of the appraisal matrix, social balance of the
appraisal network, and modulus consensus of the opin-
ion dynamics. Specifically, in single-issue case, the opin-
ion matrix Y (t) converges to Y ∗ = ||Y (0)||
2
2
||Y (0)||1 sgn(Y (0))
and the appraisal matrix X(t) converges to X∗ =
||Y (0)||22
||Y (0)||1 sgn(Y (0)) sgn(Y (0))
> in one step for any Y0 ∈
Snz−row. This can be proved by substituting the initial value
directly into the system equations (1)-(3).
Remark 5: In this paper we do not introduce any assump-
tions on the logical connections between different issues.
However, as a result of the interplay between appraisals
and opinions, we find that individuals’ opinions on differ-
ent issues are eventually correlated with each other, and
their opinions, are determined by which faction they are
in. This feature reflects the so-called opinion partisanship
phenomenon in political science [17], i.e., the correlation of
issue attitudes with party identification.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES AND VALIDATION
In this section, we illustrate our main results by numerical
simulations. Besides, Monte Carlo simulations are conducted
to support the validity of the non-vanishing condition.
A. Numerical Examples
We use here the generic initial condition. By generic initial
condition, it means that each entry of Y0 ∈ Snz−row is inde-
pendently randomly generated from the uniform distribution
on some support [−a, a]. According to the Lemma 2, our
model is independent of scaling. In this regard, we decide to
set a = 1.
t =1 t =2 t =5 t =10
X(t)
t =0 t =1 t =4 t =9
Y(t)
Fig. 1: Visualizations of the emergence of social balance and
opinion partisanship in a group of 9 individuals discussing
on 6 issues. In the visualized matrices, each grey block is
one entry and the lower the entries value, the darker its
color is. The first row of this figure shows that the appraisal
network evolves to two antagonistic factions. The second
row of this figure shows that, together with the appraisal
dynamics, the individuals’ opinions on different issues are
eventually correlated with each other and dependent purely
on what factions they are in.
We characterize the general case with 9 agents and 6
issues. See Fig. 1 for the visualization of the evolution of
the appraisal matrix and the opinion matrix, respectively. It
can be observed that in 9 steps, the appraisal matrix X(t)
achieves social balance and the opinion matrix Y (t) reaches
bipartite consensus and opinion partisanship.
B. Numerical Validation of the Non-Vanishing Appraisal
Condition
We conduct Monte Carlo simulations to validate the non-
vanishing appraisal condition for generic initial condition.
The generic initial conditions are constructed by using the
same technique in Section IV-A. For any randomly generated
generic initial condition Y (0), the random variable Z(Y (0))
is defined by
Z(Y (0)) =
{
1, if min
100≤t≤1000
mini,j |Xij(t)| ≥ 0.001
0, otherwise
(12)
By running the simulation N times independently, we can
obtain samples Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN . It follows that the frequency
of the occurrences of non-vanishing appraisal matrix is
pˆN =
∑N
i=1 Zi/N . Then the frequency pˆ can be utilized to
approximate the probability p = Prob(Z(Y (0)) = 1) with
large N . Let 1 − ξ ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − ξ ∈ (0, 1) be accuracy
and confidence level. The approximation error, i.e., |pˆN −p|,
is bounded by  with probability greater than 1 − ξ, if the
Chernoff bound is fulfilled: N ≥ 122 log 2ξ . In this paper, by
setting  = ξ = 0.01 and conducting N = 27000 simulations
with 9 agents and 4 issues, we find that pˆ = 1. In this context,
we can conclude that, for any generic initial condition with
99% confidence level, there is at least 99% probability that
every entry of |X(t)| is greater than a small positive scalar
(0.001), for all t ∈ [100, 1000]. Notice that Y (t) ∈ Snz−row
for t = [1, 999] holds if X(1000) exists. Therefore, this
simulation also validates that for any Y randomly picked
from Snz−row, f(Y ) ∈ Snz−row holds almost surely.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a new discrete-time nonlinear
model that characterizes the interplay between appraisal
dynamics and opinion dynamics. In particular, the appraisal
dynamics is based on person-entity homophily and the
opinion dynamics is an influence-based Altafini-like model
on coopetitive networks. Based on theoretical analysis and
numerical experiments, the evolution of this interplay model
show that the appraisal matrix reaches social balance and the
opinion matrix achieves modulus consensus for almost any
initial condition.
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